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ABSTRACT
What prevents the delivery of effective, high quality and safe health care in the National Health 
Service (NHS) in England? This paper presents 760 challenges which 330 NHS staff reported as 
preventing the delivery of effective, high quality and safe care. Some problems have been known for 
over 25 years (staff shortages, finance and patient complexity) but other challenges raise questions 
about the commitment of the NHS to patient and staff safety. For example, Organisational Culture 
leading to ‘stifling bureaucracy’, ‘odds stacked against smooth […] working’ and Workload resulting 
in ‘firefighting daily’ and ‘perpetual crisis mode’. The role of Human Factors/Ergonomics professional 
input (engagement with safety scientists) is discussed in the context of success stories and examples 
of Human Factors Integration from other safety critical industries (Defence, Nuclear and Rail).
Practitioner Summary: 760 challenges to the quality, effectiveness and safety of health care were 
identified at Human Factors/Ergonomics taster workshops in England. These are used to challenge 
health care providers to think about a Human Factors Integration (HFI systems) approach for safety, 
well-being and performance for all people involved in providing and receiving health care.
Introduction
There have been many papers written on safety in the 
health care industry since 2000 (Department of Health 
2000; Kohn, Corrigan, and Donaldson 2000) but despite 
pockets of good practice (Xie and Carayon 2015) there 
seems to have been relatively little progress in embedding 
safer practice, technology and changing culture (Bagian 
2012; Shekelle et al. 2013; Dixon-Woods et al. 2014). Wears 
(2015) reflected on this (and other topics) suggesting that 
the lack of progress is possibly due to ‘medicalization’ of 
the area (selective engagement), where ‘a certain school of 
thought among health professionals – managed to take it 
over, displacing other forms of scientific and professional 
activity, and turning it from a reformist movement to a 
conventional, business-as-usual activity, ironically with the 
best of intentions’. This includes a lack of engagement with 
safety scientists (including Human Factors/Ergonomics 
(HFE) specialists) in contrast to the response by other 
safety critical industries when tackling entrenched safety 
challenges (Ministry of Defence 2008; Office for Nuclear 
Regulation 2014; Office of Rail and Road 2008). The fail-
ure to utilise professional expertise has been commented 
on by Peerally et al. (2016) where root cause analyses for 
serious untoward events (including death) will be ‘typically 
conducted by local teams, not the expert accident investi-
gators who are proficient in systems thinking and human 
factors, cognitive interviewing, staff engagement and data 
analysis that are characteristic of other high-risk industries’.
In the UK, there have been initiatives to introduce HFE 
since 1990 after a change in legislation in 1986 when 
Crown Immunity from prosecution under the Health and 
Safety Act 1974 (Seccombe 1995) was removed. This meant 
that the UK National Health Service (NHS) had to comply 
with safety legislation as hospitals and other care locations 
were considered to be places of work. HFE input was used 
in 1980s–2000s for building design (Hilliar 1981), occupa-
tional health (Straker 1990) and systems approaches to 
embed HFE as part of the organisational culture (Hignett 
2001). The interest in safety moved from staff to patients 
after the Bristol heart scandal (Department of Health 
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6  S. HIgNETT ET AL.
initiatives to implement the Concordat was a series of HFE 
taster workshops (2 h) in collaboration with the UK profes-
sional body for HFE (Chartered Institute of Ergonomics & 
Human Factors [CIEHF]) to a wide range of NHS staff. The 
workshops aimed to raise awareness of HFE as a scientific 
discipline and profession amongst health care profession-
als, leaders and decision-makers.
This paper will (1) present and discuss the challenges 
which the NHS staff felt prevented the delivery of effec-
tive, high quality and safe care and (2) discuss how a HFE 
approach could be applied to some of these challenges.
Method
A series of HFE awareness raising (taster) workshops were 
delivered to over 500 health care staff through Health 
Education England (HEE)1 regional groups (https://www.
hee.nhs.uk/hee-your-area) between June and December 
2015. The 2-h workshop (accredited as a short course by 
CIEHF) provided an introduction to HFE principles and 
applications based on the International Ergonomics 
Association Core Competencies (IEA 2001). The learning 
outcomes were to demonstrate an introductory knowl-
edge of HFE principles and practices; discuss HFE problems 
in terms of understanding capabilities as design challenges 
for all the humans (both staff and patients); and discuss 
interventions in current systems (culture and processes) 
through re-design rather than adding work. The details 
of the workshop have been reported elsewhere (Hignett 
2015; Health Education England 2016).
A pre-workshop online survey was developed and 
piloted with 37 staff in two preliminary workshops. 
Changes were made to simplify the content (e.g. con-
densing clinical specialities into higher level categories) 
and add an option to decline to record any safety chal-
lenges. The survey collected data about professional roles 
2002) with seminal publications on the level of iatrogenic 
harm (Department of Health 2000; Kohn, Corrigan, and 
Donaldson 2000) reporting that at least 10% of patient 
admissions may result in some form of harm. A National 
Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) was established in 2005 with 
some excellent Human Factors projects (Norris 2009) but 
was closed in 2012 with all the HFE professionals leaving 
NHS England.
In 2013, a Concordat was signed by 16 health care 
agencies in England (including professional regulators, 
inspection agencies and education providers) stating 
that ‘a wider understanding of Human Factors principles 
and practices will contribute significantly to improving 
the quality (effectiveness, experience and safety) of care 
for patients’ (National Quality Board 2013). One of the 
Figure 1.  Word cloud of challenges preventing the delivery of 
effective, high quality and safe care.
WHO WHAT WHEN WHERE HOW WHY
Scope of issue/challenge/problem
Define stakeholders
         Participatory - Inclusive Design
Physical factors
Anthropometry (reach/clearance), Biomechanics, Postural Analysis,  
Vision (and sight lines), Hearing, Fatigue, Thermal comfort
Cognitive factors
Mental models, Individual decision making, Variability,  
Human-Computer Interaction , Navigation (unfamiliar environments)
Organisational factors
         Hierarchies (professional, employer and staff-patient relationships), 
         team stability, decision making (authority, accountability, responsibility,  
         delegation), procurement
Investigate/explore
            HFE methods
Figure 2. HFE framework used in Taster workshops (Hignett 2015).
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ERgONOMICS  7
with options for direct health care provider, manager (and 
combination of direct provider/manager), support to care 
provider (e.g. education, audit) and operational services 
(e.g. information technology). The clinical service sector 
was recorded as acute, rehabilitation/community hospital, 
gP practice, mental health organisation, hospice care, local 
authority, community health organisation, community 
pharmacy or social care organisation.
The survey asked the workshop delegates to complete 
free text fields to identify the top challenges which they 
felt prevented the delivery of effective, high quality and 
safe care. Responses were received from 330 health care 
staff identifying 760 challenges. The free text narrative 
data were imported into NVivo 10 (http://www.qsrinter-
national.com/what-is-nvivo) and a two stage analysis was 
carried out by firstly organising, reducing and describing 
the data through primary coding using the Query (Word 
Frequency) function in NVivo to give a literal Tag Cloud 
output (Figure 1). The second stage of interpretive analysis 
used an iterative process (Hignett and McDermott 2015) 
with the Tag Cloud categories for ‘top-down’ coding and 
additional emergent categories from ‘bottom-up’ cod-
ing. The generation of codes continued until theoretical 
saturation (no new instances) was achieved and then all 
data were reviewed to check for exhaustive and inclusive 
coding.
The preliminary Tag Cloud codes used for group work 
discussions within an HFE framework (Figure 2; Hignett 
2015) were:
•  Resources: including finance, staffing (including 
numbers, competencies, workload, stress/burn out, 
and training) and technology (missing and defective 
equipment).
•  Systems: including communication, Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT), reporting tools, 
patient care pathway, policies and procedures, inter-
connectivity between patients, care providers, tech-
nology systems and lack of standardisation.
•  Culture: including hierarchies (clinicians, managers, 
non-registered staff), instability (of NHS at a national 
level, individual organisations and local teams), 
silo-working (professions, specialities and sectors), 
increasing demand and service expectations (from 
patients and NHS targets), blame culture and a lack 
of clear vision leading to sustainability.
No additional data were recorded from discussions 
at the workshops so a secondary more detailed analysis 
was carried out on the narrative data from the survey. This 
ensured that all data were included (accountability) to give 
an audit trail for internal validity. The resultant higher level 
codes were subsequently discussed and presented to 
health care audiences to address issues of external validity.
Results
The workshop delegates included direct health care pro-
viders (n = 135, of whom 7 were also managers), managers 
(n = 76), support staff (n = 35) and other staff (operational 
services, clinical researchers). Most were from the acute 
sector (63%), with some staff from community services 
(13%), local authority (7%) and mental health (6%) settings. 
To gain an understanding of clinical activities, delegates 
were asked if they were registered with a professional 
regulator. Doctors (general Medical Council) accounted 
for 35% of delegates, nurses (Nursing and Midwifery 
Council) for 33%, allied health professionals (Health Care 
Professionals Council) for 16%, pharmacists (general 
Pharmaceutical Council) for 8%, dentists (general Dental 
Council) for 3% and other professions for 4%. Although 
the workshops were presented to over 500 staff, workshop 
26.4%
20.5%
19.4%
10.8%
10.5%
6.4%
3.6%
2.4%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
Organisational culture
Staff number and competency
Pressure at work
Risk management culture
Communication
Resources
Finance/budget
Patient complexity
Figure 3. Challenges preventing the delivery of effective, high quality and safe care.
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8  S. HIgNETT ET AL.
•  Administration bureaucracy: including duplication 
(task and paperwork) ‘stifling and increasing bureau-
cracy within the NHS taking care away from patients’ 
(D65); ICT ‘non-seamless, user unfriendly IT’ (D131); 
and purchasing processes.
Pressure at work (19.4%)
•  Reactionary system operation: including depart-
ment full/blocked; increasing number of patients 
‘firefighting daily’ (D27); and discharging patients 
too early ‘perpetual crisis mode, difficulty making 
time for thinking and planning, implementation, fol-
low through’ (D293).
•  Staff: physical and cognitive (stress) well-being; 
morale, commitment and enthusiasm ‘stress and 
concurrent sickness rates due to pressures to meet 
targets, patients with higher acuity and care needs’ 
(D84).
•  Time pressure: ‘time poor over stretched staff 
becoming disengaged in their roles’ (D257), ‘lack of 
time to obtain patient and carer views in other than 
perfunctory ways’ (D327).
•  Coping: including workforce resilience; competing 
priorities; following procedures; lack of teamwork; 
and lack of team continuity
lack of continuity in the team I work with Nursing team 
on my ward is not consistent. We do not have single “sis-
ter in charge” and there are frequent changes from day to 
day which impedes development of team relationships 
which improve outcome for patients on the ward. Also 
ward rounds are led by 4 different people across 5 days in 
the week – which feels disjointed. (D28)
Risk management culture (10.8%)
•  Focus on safety issues: including blame; human error; 
safety; HFE; Quality Improvement (QI); risk manage-
ment; and clinical governance; ‘recognition of safety 
issues’ (D72), ‘organisations focusing on data rather 
than the ‘what have we done about it?’ (D84) and 
‘hierarchical/pervading blame culture’ (D91).
•  External pressures (e.g. regulations and inspections): 
‘too many other priorities/expectations e.g. from 
Regulators who also don’t appear to be on board 
with how to truly improve quality’ (D190).
Communication (10.5%)
•  Communication system between sectors: ‘fragmen-
tation between services’ (D296), multi-disciplinary 
attendance varied across locations (with some failing to 
keep attendance registers).
The secondary thematic analysis recoded the chal-
lenges into eight higher level themes (Figure 3): organi-
sational culture (26.4%), staff numbers and competency 
(20.5%), pressure at work (19.4%), risk management cul-
ture (10.8%), communication (10.5%), resources (6.4%), 
finance/budget (3.6%) and patient complexity (2.4%).
At this stage, a pragmatic decision was taken to rec-
ognise that HFE may be beneficial in some, rather than 
all, themes. For example, the themes of patient complex-
ity (2.4%), staff numbers and competencies (20.5%) and 
finance (3.6%) have been known for over 25 years (Audit 
Commission 1991) relating to the ageing and increasingly 
frail population, shortage of nurses and other staff, and 
political changes. These themes are widely discussed else-
where (for example, Iacobucci 2016) and will not be further 
discussed in this paper.
Some of the data were coded in more than one theme, 
but where possible the data were coded exclusively in indi-
vidual codes, for example, some ICT issues were recorded 
as administration bureaucracy (in the Organisational 
Culture theme) to represent the policy whereas chal-
lenges associated with individual communication inter-
faces between sectors and individuals were coded to the 
Communications theme. Examples of the themes and 
illustrative quotes are as follows:
Organisational culture (26.4%)
•  Leadership: including accountability, reporting 
structures, lack of management support/vision 
‘executive level engagement of initiatives’ (D155), 
lack of support for innovation and change ‘inability 
of staff to make small incremental changes to the 
own and local practice’ (D330); challenging per-
sonalities within teams; different values and drivers 
‘organisational moving obstacles – too many mov-
ing parts meaning that the odds seem to be stacked 
against smooth theatre working rather than in their 
favour’ (D20) and individual agendas ‘people looking 
at only their interests and covering their own back, 
therefore leading to over-defensive medicine and 
management of personnel in the NHS’ (D222).
•  Models of working (system culture): including com-
plex and/or historical systems patient pathways 
‘complexity of policy/procedure’ (D213); lack of inte-
gration (silo working) and standardisation including 
discharge; organisational policies and processes 
‘clinical guidelines that don’t make accessing infor-
mation easy’ (D25); and roles/responsibilities ‘diffi-
cult in-house structures which means that reporting 
lines are not transparent’ (D89).
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ERgONOMICS  9
‘materials inaccessible or difficult to locate in a timely- 
fashion’ (D69).
Discussion
Before discussing these themes and the role of HFE, it is 
acknowledged that the data have limitations due to the 
self-selection by delegates for both workshop attendance 
and completion of the pre-workshop survey.
The five themes have been represented in a modified 
[Swiss] Cheese model (Figure 4) to represent the greatest 
challenges to the delivery of effective, high quality and 
safe care. The lack of barriers for each theme is represented 
by the size and number of holes in each cheese slice.
In this paper, the Organisational Culture theme is repre-
sented as ‘more hole than cheese’ as it continues to be an 
‘ultimate challenge’ (Leape 2004). Organisational culture as 
a theoretical concept has been discussed and defined by 
many academic disciplines (Helmreich and Merritt 1998). 
This has led to opportunities for health care safety initia-
tives to be selective both about the term and the concept 
depending on the interests and focus of the researchers. 
Over the last 30 years, there have been many appeals for 
cultural change in the NHS with some success ‘in changing 
some of the surface manifestations of medical culture … 
[but] less successful in penetrating the deeply entrenched 
values and beliefs (and power bases) that underpin clin-
ical practice’ (Davies, Nutley, and Mannion 2000) and it is 
likely this will continue with new initiatives at least every 
5–10 years to restructure at national and local levels.
One of the first issues often raised about health care 
organisational culture is the complexity of the dynamic 
system(s) within care organisations, across care sectors and 
between professional domains (Carayon and Wood 2010). 
teams/staff including handover and outliers, and 
patients’ expectations (compliments and complaints) 
‘systems design i.e. interconnectivity between peo-
ple, care providers, technologies’ (D129).
•  Communication lack and barriers ‘communication 
physical barriers – bleeping the correct person, 
being bleeped, finding a phone to answer back on’ 
(D20).
•  Communication: distractions/interruptions ‘lack of 
consideration to environmental factors that impact 
on humans and processes e.g. distractions/interrup-
tions’ (D323).
Resources (6.4%)
•  Including equipment (missing, available, defective 
etc.); limited space and environmental problems 
Figure 4. More holes than [Swiss] Cheese to represent the lack of barriers for unsafe acts (inspired by Reason 2000).
Education 
One management line 
One profession  
Defence 
More than one profession  
One management line 
Healthcare
More than one profession 
More than one management line 
Figure 5. Management hierarchies in Service Industries (modified 
from Hignett 2003).
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10  S. HIgNETT ET AL.
and the Rail Accident Investigation Board) have SQEP HFE 
professionals employed to review and advise on risk and 
safety management. The HFE principles are embedded and 
used to ‘inform any major change as well as evaluations 
of intended or actual system modifications with areas 
of activity embracing culture, competence, cognition, 
equipment, environment, functions and tasks as part of a 
systems approach’ (Wilson 2014) with a clear structure for 
application (Figure 6).
The Pressure at Work slice also has large holes to reflect 
the lack of barriers for what was described as a reaction-
ary system with full/blocked departments, time pressures, 
competing priorities and coping strategies including work 
force (rather than system) resilience. There are research 
studies linking excessive workload to increasing errors, 
for example, nurses working shifts longer than 12 h or for 
more than 40 h per week (Olds and Clarke 2010; Rogers 
et al. 2004) and interns working ‘frequent shifts of 24  h 
or more’ (Landrigan et al. 2004). In the aviation industry, 
workload as flight time limitation has been addressed 
since 1944, with harmonised minimum European crite-
ria from 2008 and consideration for human performance 
throughout the 24-h period (‘Window of Circadian Low’; 
European Cockpit Association 2007).
Health care practitioners frequently modify their work 
practices as part of individual and team coping strategies. 
This ability to adjust to uncertainties provides resilience 
within the system to sustain and balance the goals of safety 
and efficiency. However, such adjustments may also be 
cited as a contributory factor for an unsafe event (incident) 
especially where investigations focus on human behaviour 
(blame culture) rather than proactive risk management. 
We suggest that this has created a misunderstanding in 
the term resilience, where staff training (human resilience) 
in leadership, teamwork and communication is proposed 
The organisational complexity of the NHS was previously 
represented and compared with other sectors by Hignett 
(Figure 5: 2003) to show the NHS hierarchy with multiple 
professional and management lines. This was contrasted 
with other service (public) domains with Defence as a 
multi-professional organisation with one managerial line 
and Education as a single (combined) management and 
professional structure.
We suggest that one of the first contributions HFE 
experts can deliver is understanding and experience of 
safety integration within complex systems. HFE input 
has been successfully delivered in the UK Defence sector 
across domains for the army, navy and air force and across 
many professional groups. There are both examples of HFE 
Standards (Ministry of Defence 2008, 2015) and defini-
tions for HFE Suitably Qualified and Experienced Person 
(SQEP; Ministry of Defence 2015). There are also examples 
from other complex safety critical industries, for example, 
Nuclear and Rail. In the Nuclear sector, the HFE SQEP roles 
have been delivered as ‘both in-house and consultants to 
move the HFE programme forwards’ (Office for Nuclear 
Regulation 2014). In health care, the concept of SQEP has 
been discussed by Williams and Bagian (2010) as part of 
the HFE in patient safety training program at the Veterans 
Health Administration National Center where they com-
ment that ‘clinicians understand that they put patients at 
risk when diagnosis and treatment of pathophysiology lie 
outside their expertise’.
The scope of HFE potential at the organisational level 
can be seen from the UK Rail industry the last 17  years 
where HFE has successfully been integrated across multiple 
organisations (Network Rail, Train Operating Companies, 
Railway Safety and Standards Board – http://www.rssb.
co.uk/improving-industry-performance/human-factors). 
The UK rail regulatory bodies (Office of Road and Rail (ORR) 
There are three main aspects to Human Factors that can impact on people's health and 
safety-related behaviour.  
• Job: Tasks, workload, environment, displays and controls, procedures.  
• Individual: Competence, skills, personality, attitudes, risk perception.  
• Organisation: Culture, leadership, resources, work patterns, communications  
Human Factors cuts across the boundaries between many traditional railway industry 
disciplines and yet adequate management of Human Factors is often overlooked. Human 
Factors are not a series of independent issues to be conveniently addressed in isolation, 
or on a piece-meal basis. Nor can Human Factors be effectively incorporated just before 
the end of a project or design process. Instead, Human Factors considerations should be 
integrated throughout the lifecycle of systems development, functions of the owner 
organisation and the different roles of individuals in project teams.
Figure 6. Human Factors in the Rail Industry (Office of Road and Rail; http://orr.gov.uk/publications/guidance/health-and-safety/human-
factors-guidance).
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ERgONOMICS  11
The challenges of Communication within complex 
systems are not new. Nembhard and Edmondson (2006) 
discussed an entrenched status culture in health care 
which contributed to the barriers for integrated working 
across sectors and professional boundaries, and possibly 
also to patient safety events (Institute of Medicine 2003). 
Information systems in health care do not currently ben-
efit from standards which require the application of HFE 
or user centred design principles (BS EN ISO 13407 1999; 
BS EN ISO 9241-210 2010). The Health and Social Care 
Information System is the UK national provider for informa-
tion, data and technical systems in health care. It is respon-
sible for the setting up and managing of ICT systems in 
health care and sets the standards and guidelines for data 
collection and reporting of information. We suggest that 
the current approach is driven by technology providers 
offering like-for-like technical solutions for existing sys-
tems as a ‘one size-fits-all’ solution rather than working 
with HFE professionals to understand and redesign the 
ICT systems in contrast to the mandatory involvement of 
HFE for Defence procurement (http://www.scs-ltd.co.uk/
wp-content/uploads/Case-study-DTT.pdf). This approach 
may create a stagnant ICT culture where health care staff 
are stifled by lack of engagement with their working prior-
ities and operational needs despite optimism about ben-
efits from ICT and opportunities for a more co-ordinated 
‘joined up’ way of working (Waterson 2014). HFE has yet to 
be fully integrated nationally into either the development 
process or evaluation of health care technology systems 
which in some cases mimic unreliable or inefficient paper 
version and require staff to ‘work around’ the final product 
(Clarke, Belden, and Kim 2014).
Accessing Resources (equipment and consumables) is 
represented in Figure 4 as the slice with the fewest holes 
suggesting a fairly robust barrier; however, this may be 
due to the coping culture rather than a reflection of good 
practice in procurement and logistics. Cox, Chicksand, and 
Ireland (2005) commented on a health care procurement 
rather than system resilience; this results in [trained] staff 
continuing to work in pressured conditions. The term resil-
ience, in the context of HFE, relates to resilience engineer-
ing (Hollnagel, Woods, and Wreathall 2011) and seeks to 
understand how a system can be engineered to anticipate 
and monitor variability in a system whilst recognising why 
this occurs, and how engineering (system) responses can 
preserve safety. Increasing the human resilience ignores 
the influence of the whole system and is likely to result in 
increased pressure on staff, as reported by the workshop 
delegates.
Risk Management slice has been used to cover a wide 
range of operational issues including quality improvement, 
financial risk (corporate governance) and clinical governance 
(Scally and Donaldson 1998). In the NHS, quality and safety 
were explicitly linked in the late 1990s following the Bristol 
heart scandal (1984–1995; Department of Health 2002). 
There have been multiple initiatives which have included 
clinical audit, clinical effectiveness, education and training, 
research and development, openness, risk management and 
information management. As mentioned earlier, the NHS 
tends to restructure every few years and these initiatives 
have been led by the Commission for Health Improvement 
(CHI, 1999–2004; Day and Klein 2004), Commission for 
Health Audit and Inspection (CHAI, 2004–2009), Care Quality 
Commission (2009-), the National Quality Board (2009-), NPSA 
(2001–2012), NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement 
(2005–2013), NHS Improving Quality (2013–2016) and NHS 
Improvement (2016-). In 2016, the Care Quality Commission 
(Care Quality Commission 2016) reviewed the way that NHS 
acute hospitals investigated serious incidents and gave five 
recommendations. HFE professionals can directly respond 
to two of these by providing 
skilled analysis to move the focus of investigation from 
the acts or omissions of staff, to identifying the underly-
ing causes of the incident’ and ‘human factors principles 
to develop solutions that reduce the risk of the same inci-
dents happening again.
Integration:  who, what, when, where, how and why 
— Who   = Every one: patients, staff, visitors, contractors, NHS 
policymakers, board members, commissioners etc. 
— What   = Safety as performance (quality) and wellbeing issue 
— When  = All the time (including emergencies, CBRNe etc.) 
— Where  = All sectors and locations 
— How  = Embedded and SIMPLE by design of systems including 
workplace procedures, undergraduate and postgraduate training, 
national policy and procurement etc. 
— Why  = Human sympathetic (we all have limitations…) 
Figure 7. Human Factors Integration principles for Healthcare: who, what, when, where, how and why.
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can be seen as a system of systems when looking at 
maintenance and replacement regimes. (Wilson 2014)
Although many of these challenges are not new, the 
survey information has provided an opportunity to pres-
ent and discuss NHS staff concerns about the delivery of 
effective, high quality and safe care. The role of HFE profes-
sional input has been discussed with examples from other 
UK safety critical industries and we believe that Human 
Factors Integration is vital to enhance safety in health care. 
However, we suggest that no progress will be made unless 
the HFE input is delivered by qualified (SQEP) profession-
als in collaboration with health care staff so that the full 
potential of HFE in health care can be realised.
Note
1.  HEE is a non-departmental government Public Body 
that exists to support the delivery of excellent health 
care and health improvement to the patients and public 
of England by ensuring that the workforce of today 
and tomorrow has the right numbers, skills, values and 
behaviours, at the right time and in the right place.
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